Edmund E. Greenwell v. R. C. Duvall : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Edmund E. Greenwell v. R. C. Duvall : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Arthur H. Nielsen; Nielsen and Conder; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Greenwell v. Duvall, No. 8961 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3210
 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.......................................................... 1 
POINTS RELIED UPON.................................................................... 11 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 12 
I. ALLEGED ERROR IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO 
AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.. 12 
II. ALLEGED ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE .................................................... 14 
III. ALLEGED ERROR IN RECEIVING THE TESTI-
MONY OF WITNESSES, FELT, TANSIL, DOUG-
LAS, FOULGER AND SHREEVE........................................ 18 
IV. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT........ 22 
V. WERE THE REPRESENTATIONS FOUND TO 
HAVE BEEN MADE ACTIONABLE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW? .................................................................................. 23 
VI. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT.................................................................................... 41 
VII. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY ON PROOF OF DAM-
AGES TO THE PLAINTIFF.................................................. 47 
CONCLUSION........................................................................................ 50 
AUTHORITIES- Cases Cited 
Ackerman v. Bramwell Inv. Co., 80 Utah 52, 12 P. 2d 623............ 32 
Baird v. Eflow Investment Co., et al., 76 Utah 232, 289 Pac. 112 .. 29, 39 
Beaver Drug Co. v. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 Pac. 695.................... 30 
Boddy v. Henry, et al., 85 N.W. 77L.................................................. 15 
Campbell v. Zion's Co-op Home Building and Real Estate Com-
pany, 46 Utah 1, 148 Pac. 40L.................................................. 26 
Crowley v. Goodrich, 44 A. 2d 128.................................................... 46 
Davis Stock Company v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 P. 2d 988............ 14 
De Frees v. Carr, 8 Utah 488, 33 Pac. 217........................................ 41 
Douglas v. Duvall, 5 Utah 2d 429, 304 P. 2d 373 ............................ 1, 2, 23 
Hecht. v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37 .................................... 27, 46, 48 
J. C. Miller Estate, Inc., v. Drury, 120 Wash. 694, 208 P. 77........ 39 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E 0 F C 0 N T E N T S - (Continued) 
Page 
Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. 2d 1094 .................................. --40, 48 
Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d 865 (1954)-------------------- 31 
Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P. 2d 61L.--------------------------------- 32 
Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Or. 100, 179 P. 2d 550 ....... ----------------------------- 22 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273 ..... ------------------------------- 28, 48 
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Company, 121 Utah 339, 241 P. 2d 914.... 49 
Paulson v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P. 2d 62L______________________________ 23 
Sandler v. Elliott (1957) 141 N.E. 2d 367..·------------------------------------- 16 
Smith v. Gilbert, 49 Utah 510, 164 P. 1026---------------------------------------- 21 
Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 
63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791.. _________________________________________________ 25, 26, 27, 48 
Trout and Resort Company v. Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687.... 21 
U.S. v. Ben Grunstein and Sons Co., 137 Fed. Supp. 197................ 49 
White v. Gordon, 130 Or. 139, 279 P. 289·------------------------------------------- 49 
Rule 15 (a) 
Rule 17 (a) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 19 (a) and (b) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 61 
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES 
13 
17 
17 
50 
51 A.L.R. Page 94 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
27 A.L.R. 2d Page 38 .. ·---------------·----------·-----------------------·---------·---------·--·· 35 
20 Am. Jur., EVIDENCE, Section 339 P. 315................................ 20 
23 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section 28, P. 785............ 33 
23 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 29................................ 36 
23 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section 30............................ 37 
23 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section 181, Page 1000____ 15 
24 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 217, et seq................. 48 
24 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Page 55, Sec. 227................ 47 
24 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 293 .............................. 38 
McCormick on Evidence, 1954 Edition, Sec. 164................................ 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDMUND E. GREENWELL, 
Pla.intiff arnd Respondent, 
-vs.-
R. C. DUVALL, 
Defendant and Appellarnt. 
Case 
No. 8961 
RESPO·NDENT''S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellant has devoted considerable space in his brief 
to a statement of the background and facts in regard 
to the matter before the Court. In reading this statement, 
the Court may recall the case of Douglas v. Duvall, where 
the appeal was taken by the Plaintiff from an adverse 
ruling by a jury. The Court's decision is reported in 
5 Utah 2d 429, 304 P. 2d 373. That case is related to this 
case in that they both involve the same Defendant and 
arise from the transactions relating to the financing of 
the operations of the Duvall Mine. There is, however, a 
marked difference in the two claims which, as the Court 
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will perceive, amply explains why the Plaintiff in the pre-
vious case may have lost while the Plaintiff in the instant 
case was successful. The Plaintiff Frank Douglas in the 
other case commenced making loans to the Duvall Com-
pany in the Spring of 1950, prior to the time the mine was 
put in operation. At that time the engineering reports, 
which the Defendant relied upon as showing his good 
faith and which he testified were shown to the Plaintiff 
Douglas, indicated the presence of 200,000 tons of '' prov-
en and probable ore reserves having values of about $7.00 
per ton.'' The estimate given in the report for mining 
and milling costs totaled $3.28 per ton which on the basis 
of a 90% recovery would leave a profit of $3.02 per ton or 
$6,004.00 for the ore body investigated. 
In its opinion the Court comments upon the jury's 
verdict as follows : 
''Significant facts which support such conclusion 
included an inspection by plaintiff, prior to any 
loan, of a competent engineer's report and 
map showing the mine's location, drilling data, 
estimated tonnage, production costs and ore 
values ... '' 
The transaction in the instant matter, however, took 
place after three ( 3) years of unsuccessful operation of 
the mine - when all of the actual experience of those 
years repudiated the engineer's estimates given in Jan-
uary, 1950. 
Defendant Duvall testified that upon receiving the 
engineering report from Roger Pierce in January 1950 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2 in this case) it was determined 
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to incorporate and proceed to raise funds to build a mill 
and operate the mine (Tr. 89-91). The Articles of Incor-
poration (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) show that the Company 
was incorporated for $1,000,000, of which $700,000 was 
issued. The issued stock was given to the incorporators 
(consisting of Duvall, three members of his family, Fred-
rick Froerer and Lawrence S. Berrett) in exchange for 
the mining properties and the improvements or machin-
ery located thereon. The Duvall interests received 55,000 
shares of stock, having a par value of $550,000. 
Following incorporation it was necessary to borrow 
money to build the mill ( Tr. 23, 89). Initially, $100,000 
(not $80,000 as stated in Appellant's Brief) was raised 
by borrowing from Frank Douglas and others, including 
Defendant Duvall and his associates Froerer and Ber-
rett. (Exhibi~ R) Mr. Duvall testified that only $80;000 
was borrowed (Tr. 91) but the actual records disclose 
otherwise (which only goes to reflect upon the accuracy 
of Appellant's testimony). 
Although the Pierce report (Exhibit 2) further 
stated that ''it is estimated that to build this plant and 
get it into operation approximately $100,000 will be 
needed," it turned out that the initial borrowings were 
inadequate so that in August, 1950, a so-called ''assess, 
ment'' was levied on each stockholder in proportion to 
his stock. (Tr. 142) Mr. Duvall, owning by far the great-
er portion of the stock, was assessed the greatest amount. 
The mine and mill were operated from the first of 
September until December, 1950. Appellant states "the 
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recoveries made during the first year's operation were 
not good." This is indeed an understatement of the fact. 
Exhibit B discloses that for every ounce of gold recov-
ered (worth $35 per ounce) it cost $108.71, without con-
sidering any depreciation on the mill and equipment 
which had been installed at a cost of approximately 
$120,000. 
About December 14, 1950, Mr. Romney prepared a 
schedule of the mill tonnage and precipitate shipments 
for the year 1950 (Exhibit D). This was received by Mr. 
Duvall about that time (Tr. 25-27). From this Exhibit 
(as well as the verbal testimony of the various parties 
concerned with the operation of the mine) it appears that 
the average assay of the ore being mined was .15 ounces 
of gold per ton, which at the value of $35 per ounce 
would be approximately $5.25 per ton. However, only 
a bout 32.6% of the gold was being recovered so that ap-
proximately $1.95 was actually being recovered from 
each ton of ore mined (See also Exhibit Y). At the same 
time it cost $9.49 per ton to mine the ore so that the com-
pany suffered a loss of in excess of $7.50 for every ton 
mined (See Exhibit Y). This information was well known 
to Defendant, Duvall, who was kept informed from day 
to day and week to week as to what was taking place. 
(Tr 24, 31, 36) As stated by Mr. Roger Pierce, the en-
gineer, ''Certainly we bumped into troubles the first min-
ute we turned the material over." (Tr. 281) 
Because of the loss sustained during the 1950 oper-
ating season it was necessary to raise more money to 
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make changes in the operation and to continue with the 
operation. This was done by additional borrowings. As 
expressed by Mr. Duvall, "That's the only way we had of 
obtaining money." (Tr. 38) Following the close of opera-
tion, about December 1, 1950, until May 15, 1951, when the 
next year's operation commenced, $55,000 more was bor-
rowed from various individuals. (Plaintiff's Exhibit R) 
An income and expense statement prepared for the 
Company covering the period September 1, 1950, to 
March 31, 1951, discloses that the Company had a total 
operating loss of $54,039.79 (Plaintiff's ;Exhibit E). At 
that time the capital stock of $700,000 issued and out-
standing was impaired by the amount of $54,039.79 and 
thus the Company was insolvent. (See Exhibit E) The 
records further reveal that the Company thereafter re-
mained insolvent up until the time that operations were 
abandoned in the Fall of 1953. (See Exhibits E, K, P, T, 
and 13) 
Although the per cent of recovery of gold from the 
ore was increased in the year 1951 from approximately 
32% to 63% the over-all picture of the operation did not 
change to any degree. Exhibit F (which contains a sum-
mary of the mine operation) discloses that a total of 
21,468 tons of ore were processed, averaging .164 ounces 
of gold per ton. Converted to dollar value, this would 
indicate that the ore being processed would average $5.74 
per ton gold content. However, since only 62% of the 
gold was being recovered, the actual recovery from the 
ore processed was approximately $3.45 per ton (Exhibit 
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Y). At the same time the costs of operation, including 
depreciation and depletion, were $7.48 per ton, leaving 
a net loss of $4.03 for every ton mined in that year (Ex-
hibit Y). According to the statement of profit and loss 
and balance sheet prepared for the company covering the 
period to September 30, 1951, the company had an oper-
ating loss of $28,477.92 up to that time without consider-
ing any depreciation or depletion. (Plaintiff's Exhibit K) 
This Exhibit further reflects the increased insolvency of 
the company. 
Again at the end of the 1951 season it was neces-
sary to look to further borrowing in order to have money 
to be prepared to operate in the 1952 season and to make 
such changes as they desired to make in the plant opera-
tion. As testified by 1\ir. Duvall there was no source of 
revenue other than what might come in from the gold or 
from the moneys which were borrowed (Tr. 39). For the 
period of operation in 1951 the company received 
$7 4,112.19 from gold recovery and the cost of oper-
ation (including depreciation and depletion) came to 
$160,570.33. The difference between these two figures had 
to be made up by borrowings according to :Jir. Duvall 
(Tr. 39). Exhibit R discloses that it was apparently 
necessary at all times and continually after the company 
started operations on September 1, 1950, to engage in 
substantial borrowings. From J\iay 15, 1951, until Decem-
ber 1, 1952, a total of $112,558.37 was borrowed, making 
a total borrowing of $167,558.37 after the completion of 
the plant in the Fall of 1950 and up to December 1,1952. 
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Of this amount nothing was contributed or loaned by 
Mr. Duvall or his associates (Exhibit R). 
The 1952 operation was little different from the oper-
ation in 1951. The per cent of recovery of gold from 
the ore remained about the same ( 62%). Since the ore 
assayed about the same as to its gold content, the pro-
ceeds per ton remained about the same. The only changes 
were in the cost of operation, which increased from $7.48 
per ton to $7.98 per ton and the over-all production 
from the mine which increased from 21,468 tons to 27,000 
tons so that the over-all loss increased substantially, as 
did the net loss per ton which increased from $4.03 to 
$4.30 per ton (Exhibit Y). 
In 1952, a total of $99,539.71 was received from the 
sale of the gold recovered from the ore. At the same 
time it cost $215,444.54 for operation (including de-
preciation and depletion) leaving an operating loss for 
the period of approximately $115,000 (Exhibit Y). 
Again, Mr. Duvall testified that he was aware from.week 
to week of the operations of the company during the 
1952 season and of the reports showing the gold content 
of .the ore being processed as well as the cost of the min-
ing operations. (Tr. 39) Plaintiff's Exhibits M and 0 
are interesting in that they disclose that during the years 
1951 and 1952 there were daily plant reports prepared 
by the company superintendent and furnished to Duvall, 
which reports showed the assays of the ore being proc-
essed and the recovery therefrom. These reports were 
cumulative so that from month to month it was possible 
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to determine at a moment's glance the total amount of 
ore which had been processed up to that time, the assay 
content thereon, and the gold recovery therefrom. 
At the end of the 1952 season, Mr. Duvall testified, 
it was necessary to engage in additional borrowings in 
order to put in some new tanks, engage in further strip-
ping operations and for operation expenses generally. 
(Tr. 39, 40) Although Appellant states in his Brief 
(Page 5) that in the Fall of 1952 it was necessary to 
expend over $31,500 for the purchase and installation of 
three additional thickener tanks, the records of the com-
pany do not support that statement. According to the 
records of the company, as analyzed by an independent 
certified public accountant, Paul B. Tanner (Exhibit X) 
the only expense incurred by the company for additional 
plant equipment after October, 1952, was the sum of 
$525 paid for freight in the Spring of 1953. There was 
one payment of $5,000 in October which Mr. Tanner testi-
fied might have been used for the purchase of additional 
equipment. (Tr. 236-241) 
From the foregoing it would appear that the finan-
cial situation of the company as of December 1, 1952, was 
rather critical. Apparently it was sufficiently serious 
that Mr. Duvall himself felt impelled to put an addi-
tional $5,000 into the company. This was the first money 
which he had advanced to the company after the origi-
nal construction of the mill had been completed in the 
Fall of 1950 (Exhibit R). His advance was made on De-
cember 9, 1952, for which he received a promissory note. 
On the same date Francis Cave also loaned the company 
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$5,000. About this time, Mr. Duvall, who was only cas-
ually acquainted with the Plaintiff (Tr. 13), saw Plain-
tilff at the Weber Club and invited him to come to De-
fendant's office in the Ogden First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association to discuss a matter of business. 
At the time of this transaction, he was president 
and general manager of the Ogden First Federal Sav-
ings and Loan, with which institution he had been asso-
ciated for over 20 years. (Tr. 13) Defendant, prior to 
coming to Ogden and being involved in the Duvall mine 
operation, had ten years of experience in oil and gas 
exploration and development. ( Tr. 15) 
Mr. Duvall testified that when Plaintiff came into 
Defendant's office a few days later, Defendant asked 
the Plaintiff to make a loan to the Duvall Company. 
At that time Defendant testified he was not sure whether 
he knew Mr. Duvall had $5,000 on deposit with the Ogden 
First Federal. ( Tr. 136). He later denied he knew of 
Mr. Greenwell's deposit with the Company. (Tr. 137) 
Plaintiff, however, testified that Mr. Duvall asked him 
to investment $5,000 in the company. (Tr. 173) This 
fact is particularly significant because at that time Mr. 
Greenwell had on deposit with the institution of which 
Mr. Duvall was president and general manager the 
sum of $5,000. 
Mr. Duvall further testified that at the time Mr. 
Greenwell came into the bank to talk to him that he (Mr. 
Duvall) discussed the general operation of the mine with 
the Plaintiff. (Tr. 60) When asked if he made any state-
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ment to him with respect to the amount of ore that had 
been blocked out, he testified that he showed Mr. Green-
well the report which had been made in January of 1950 
by Mr. Pierce and showed him on the report what Mr. 
Pierce had stated with respect to this matter. (Tr. 60, 61) 
At that time the operating bills of the company were not 
paid but this fact was not disclosed to Plaintiff. (Tr. 63) 
Following the discussion Mr. Greenwell agreed to 
loan the company $5,000 and gave his personal check 
therefor. (Tr. 211, Exhibit L) In turn, he received a 
promissory note on a form used by the Commercial Se-
curity Bank (in which company Duvall was a director). 
The Bank's name was crossed out and the name of the 
Plaintiff and his wife, as joint tenants with full right 
of survivorship, was filled in. This note is dated De-
cember 21, 1952, and is a demand note since no future 
date for payment is specified. (Exhibit M) Plaintiff was 
also given 500 shares of stock which was put in the name 
of Plaintiff and his wife as joint tenants with full right 
of survivorship (Exhibit V). At the time the loan was 
made the Duvall Company was hopelessly insolvent and 
unable to pay its bills except from additional borrowings 
which were made after Plaintiff's loan in the additional 
amount of approximately $30,000. (Exhibits R. T) At 
the time it ceased operation it owed substantial sums for 
unpaid bills in addition to the unpaid notes of $325,044.17 
plus accrued interest. (Exhibits R., T) 
During its 3 years of operation the company had 
mined 113,409 tons of ore assaying approximately $5.50 
per ton, from which it had recovered gold at the rate of 
10 
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approximately $3.10 per ton of ore for a total income 
from operations of $351,250.77. At the same time it had 
cost $732,754.51 for operations (which did not include 
the cost of the mill and other capital equipment but did 
include depreciation thereon of $90,545.37 and $18,590.23 
for depletion). (Plaintiff's Exhibits T and Y, and De-
fendant's Exhibit 13) 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
Appellant has listed several points for consideration 
by this Court in seeking a reversal of the decision of the 
lower court. Inasmuch as each of these points has been 
separately argued in Appellant's Brief, Respondent will 
answer them in the same order, as follows : 
I. Alleged error in permitting Plaintiff to amend 
his Complaint at the time of trial. 
II. Alleged error in denying Defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the conclusion of Palintiff's evidence. 
III. Alleged error in receiving the testimony of wit-
nesses, Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger and 
Shreeve. 
IV. Alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the Findings and Judgment. 
V. Were the representations found to have been 
made actionable as a matter of law~ 
VI. Alleged insufficiency of the Findings of Fact. 
VII. Alleged insufficiency on proof of damages to the 
Plaintiff. 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ALLEGED ERROR IN PERMITTING PLAIN-
TIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL. 
The matter of the amendment to Plaintiff's Com-
plaint was discussed by the Court and counsel at the be-
ginning of the trial. At that time, as counsel for Plain-
tiff pointed out, the proposed amendment conformed to 
the amendments which were theretofore made in the 
Douglas Case and which amendments were well known 
to Defendant, thereby negativating any surprise on the 
part of the latter. As pointed out by Defendant's counsel 
at that time: 
''Now, this isn't a new proposition. We have 
considered this same matter in the previous Doug-
las case that has been tried and disposed of- and 
I might say that in that case the defect -was cured 
by amendment, which has never been proposed in 
this case." (Tr. P. 3) 
After the proposed amendments in the instant case 
were read to the court and discussed by counsel, the court 
made the following observation: 
THE CouRT: Well, I don't think it could take 
you by surprise because the conversations you've 
had, and the recollection of those conversations, 
would be such that that is what is proof, after all is 
said and done, and the proof-
MR. OLMSTEAD: The Douglas case was a com-
pletely different case than this. 
12 
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THE CouRT : Yes, but this case is based upon 
certain representations. 
MR. OLMSTEAD : Certain alleged representa-
tions specified in the complaint-
THE CouRT: Growing out of certain conver-
sations at a certain time and certain place. 
MR. OLMSTEAD: Right; and in his deposition 
he outlined what those representations were, and 
now this is a complete departure from that. (Fur-
ther Argument on Motion) 
THE CouRT: Well, I'll overrude the objection 
and the amendment may be made to paragraph 4. 
I want it made in writing, though. I want it re-
duced to writing." (Tr. p. 7-8) 
Following this discussion, counsel for Defendant did 
not make any claim that he was in any way prejudiced 
in preparing the case for trial or that by reason of the 
amendments being made he would not be able to proceed 
with the trial of the case. On the contrary, the facts dis-
close that he had at all times been aware that technical 
amendments made in the Douglas case would of necessity 
be made likewise in the instant matter and if the case 
had been pre-tried by the court there is no doubt that 
such amendments would have been proposed and made 
at that time. 
Rule 15 (a) U.R.C.P. provides: 
''A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served or if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and 
the action has not been placed upon the trial cal-
13 
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endar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response 
to the original pleading or within 10 days after 
service of the amended pleading, whichever period 
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
orders." (Emphasis added) 
See Davis Stock Company v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 
P. 2d 988, where this Court indicated the liberal nature 
of this rule at the same time outlining the essential ele-
ments which have to be pleaded in a fraud case. 
In view of these facts, we respectfully submit that 
the trial court did not err in granting Plaintiff's motion 
to amend. 
II. ALLEGED ERROR IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CON-
CLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
As stated by Appellant in this case, Plaintiff's theory 
is that he was induced by false and fraudulent represen-
tations of the Defendant to make a loan of $5,000 to the 
Duvall Company. Appellant in his brief concedes that the 
loan was made by Respondent and the record is clear that 
the check (Exhibit L) was drawn on Respondent's per-
sonal account (Tr. 211). Nowhere is it argued that Plain-
tiff's wife made the loan or had anything to do with it. 
Appellant urges, however, that since the note was made 
14 
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payable to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's wife ''as joint ten-
ants, with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants 
in common" that Plaintiff is not the proper party to 
bring this action. 
The law on this point is well stated in 23 Am Jur 
Fraud and Deceit, Section 181, page 1000: 
''The question as to who may complain of fraud, 
other elements existing, is determined by the real 
interest of the parties. Thus, the right of one who 
trades property for corporate stock to recover for 
false representations by the owners of the stock 
to recover for false representations by the owners 
of the stock as to the amount of the corporate 
property is not affected by the fact that some of 
the stock is taken in the names of other persons by 
his direction.' ' 
The case of Boddy v. Henry et al., 85 N.W. 771, which 
is cited as authority for this statement. involved a situa-
tion where the plaintiff had traded some of his real prop-
erty to defendants in exchange for corporate stock. 
When plaintiff took the stock from defendants, he had 
some of it made out in the names of members of his fam-
ily. In answer to the defendant's contentions that plain-
tiff should not be allowed to recover damages as to this 
stock, the court had this to say at page 77 4: 
''Some of the stock acquired by the plaintiff in this 
transaction was taken in the names of members of 
his family, and defendants complain that plaintiff 
was not entitled to recover damages for deprecia-
tion in the value of such shares, due to misrepre-
sentations as to the quantity of land. But we do 
not concur in this view. The entire body of stock 
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transferred by defendants was so transferred in 
consideration of the exchange of plaintiff's prop-
erty, and his right to recover for any deficiency in 
the value of such stock due to misrepresentations 
would not be affected by the fact that some of the 
stock thus acquired by him was, by his directions, 
put into the hands of others.'' 
The present case involves an identical situation. Re-
spondent here made the loan with his personal check. 
The fact that the note was thereafter made out in the 
name of Respondent and his wife should not defeat his 
right to recover for the damage sustained. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts when faced 
with a similar situation made a ruling to the same effect. 
See the very recent case of Sarn.dler v. Elliot (1957), 
141 N.E. 2d 367. This case involved the purchase of a 
franchise by two brothers. One of the brothers subse-
quently commenced an action to recover the damages he 
had suffered as a result of alleged fraud by the seller. 
Both brothers did not join as plaintiffs. In fact, at no 
place in the pleadings did it appear that the contract in-
volved more than the sellers and the plaintiff. The de-
fendants upon appeal argued that this defect was fatal. 
The court, however, did not agree and held the follow-
ing: (p. 372) 
''The omission to allege, or, through references to 
the contract, show, that the brother was a 'pur-
chaser' under it does not make the cause different 
from that proved. The suit is not for damage to 
joint property (the contract) or for joint loss or 
for the brother's loss; it is for the for loss caused 
to this plaintiff only. The brother is not concerned 
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in the cause of action for that separate tort. Baker 
v. Jewell, 6 Mass. 460, 462. See_ Thompson v. Pen-
tecost, 210 Mass. 223, 228, 96 N.E. 335. Compare 
Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. 246, 257. The plain-
tiff, as alleged, did 'buy * * * the franchise' ; that 
the brother had become a 'purchaser' also in order 
to assume obligations to the corporation under the 
contract, did not make this legally untrue even if 
the brother also had acquired a legal title to the 
franchise. If the evidence supporting the view 
that the plaintiff had the sole beneficial interest is 
accepted, it was a substantively correct allegation 
as a matter of fact without qualification.'' 
Appellant quotes the provisions of Rule 19 (a) and 
(b), U.R.C.P., but ignores the provisions of Rule 17 (a) 
which provides : 
''Every action shall be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest; but ... a party with 
whom or in whose name a contract has been made 
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized 
by statute may sue in his own name without join-
ing with him thwparty for whose benefit the action 
is brought ... '' 
In this case the transaction took place between Plain-
tiff and Defendant. The representations were made to 
Plaintiff and induced him to make the loan. The tort was 
committed against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was damaged 
by being induced to loan his money. If, however, the 
transaction was conducted on behalf of Plaintiff and his 
wife, then under the Rule above quoted the party with 
whom the contract was made (Plaintiff) for the benefit of 
another (himself and wife) ''may sue in his own name 
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the 
17 
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action is brought.'' It must, however, be remembered that 
this is not an action on the note, but for damages for 
false and fraudulent representations made to Plaintiff 
inducing him to make a loan of $5,000 to the Duvall 
Company. 
III. ALLEGED ERROR IN RECEIVING THE 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES, FELT, TAN-
SIL, DOUGLAS, FOULGER AND SHREEVE. 
In the course of the extensive borrowings which it 
was necessary to make during the years the company 
was in operation, Appellant Duvall had repeated conver-
sations with various other individuals who were induced 
to make loans to the company. Several of these individ-
uals appeared as witnesses in the Douglas Case as well as 
in the instant matter. In offering first the testimony of 
the witness R. D. Tansil (Tr. 213), counsel for Respond-
ent submitted to the Court that the evidence was admis-
sible under the law as stated by McCormick on Evi-
dence, 1954 Edition, Section 164, as follows: 
''The policy against proving other misconduct 
of a party for the sole purpose of evidencing his 
character or disposition as raising the inference 
that he was probably guilty of the misconduct 
charged in the suit, finds expression in civil as well 
as in criminal cases. Where redress for fraud or 
misrepresentation is sought, three alternative 
theories may be available to support the admissio;n 
of evidence of other misrepresentations or fraudu-
lent conduct by the party. 
1. When under the applicable substantiYe 
law, knowledge or intent by such party is an essen-
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tial ingredient for liability, then if it be proved 
that the party has made other misrepresentations, 
of similar purport, and false in fact, this tends to 
show that the representations in suit were made 
with knowledge of their falsity and with intent to 
deceive. This inference does not require that the 
other representations should have been identical 
in purport nor made under precisely like circum-
stances. Only a reasonable approximation in pur-
port, time and circumstance is needed to ground 
the inference of knowledge or intent. 
2. If the actual making of the misrepresen-
tations charged in the suit is at issue, then to show 
the party's conduct in making the representations 
or committing the other acts of fraud as alleged, 
it is competent to prove other representations 
closely similar in purport or other fraudulent acts, 
when they may be found to be parts of a large or 
continuing plan or design, of which the acts or mis-
representations in suit may also be found to be an 
intended part or object. Similarly, it would 
seem that if the identity of the perpetrator of the 
fraud in suit were in doubt, then other fraudulent 
acts of the party so like the conduct in suit as to 
earmark them as the product of the same mind and 
hand, would be received to show that he was the 
perpetrator. 
3. The courts have not generally gone so far, 
but it is believed that the admission of evidence of 
previous similar misrepresentations to show the 
making of the present representations should, in 
civil cases at least, be extended to cover the situa-
tion where there is testimony asserting the making 
of the misrepresentation at issue, and testimony 
denying it. Here it seems that evidence in reply 
of other like misrepresentations by the party 
(whether or not part of a plan or scheme) will be 
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of much value to the trier upon the disputed ques-
tion and that this need outweighs the danger of 
prejudice. While su<}h evidence standing alone 
would not of course be sufficient to establish the 
issue, it can be of great value in resolving the con-
flict." (Emphasis added) 
While the Court did not agree with counsel as to the 
third ground for admission quoted above, it did admit 
the evidence of these witnesses as to similar statements 
made to them on other occasions for the purpose of show-
ing knowledge, intent and motive, as well as indicating 
a continuing plan or scheme. The fact that the statements 
were made to the witnesses at varying times within 8 to 
18 months of the time of the transactions involved with 
Respondent does not make the testimony inadmissible, but 
goes more to the weight to be given thereto. As stated in 
20 Am. Jur. EVIDENCE, Section 339 P. 315: 
''It is a common inquiry upon the trial wheth-
er a person made a certain statement or committed 
a specific act upon a named occasion. It is generally 
held, in this conrnection, that proof is admissible to 
show that a person said or did something of the 
same sort on a differe1zt occasion, provided it 
shows the existence of intention, knowledge, or bad 
fa.ith upon the occasion in question. Thus, similar 
fraudulent acts or representations are admissible 
if committed at or about the same time as the one 
in question and if the same motive may reasonably 
be presumed to have existed, with a view to estab-
lish the intent of the defendant in respect of the 
matter charged against him. Unless, however, such 
collateral acts are shown to be so connected with 
the matter in litigation as to make it apparent 
that the party to be charged had a common pur-
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pose in both, they are inadmissible. Collateral 
proof of knowledge or intention must be limited to 
a certain period so that it may naturally throw 
light upon the intent with which the act in ques-
tion was committed. The question. of the period of 
time during which other acts may be proved is 
largely a matter within the discretion. of the trial 
court." (Emphasis supplied) 
Appellant recognizes the previous pronouncement by 
this Court as contained in Trout a;nd Resort Company v. 
Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687, and Smith v. Gilbert, 49 
Utah 510, 164 P. 1026. In the latter case the Court dis-
cussed the former decision and made the following de-
termination: 
"The District Court, in ruling upon the ad-
mission of evidence, attempted to be governed by 
the rule laid down by this court in the case of 
Trout and Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 
Pac. 687, where the rule is stated in the tenth head-
note in the following words : 
'' 'False representations, similar to the 
ones involved in an action, are admissible 
where the intent, motive, or knowledge of 
their falsity by the party making them are 
material, or where it is sought to prove a 
system or general plan or scheme to 
defraud.' 
''The court thus permitted appellant to prove 
by other witnesses to whom the plaintiff had sold 
some of the capital stock of said corporations 
about the time the appellant purchased the stock 
in question that the plaintiff had made representa-
tions and statements to them to the same effect 
as those which appellant testified were made to 
him concerning the stock. '' 
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Appellant argues that the testimony of the other wit-
nesses as to statements made to them on other occasions 
by the defendant was inadmissible because there was no 
proof that such representations were false. In urging 
this position Appellant ignores not only the testimony of 
Plaintiff's witnesses but the testimony of Defendant's 
witnesses, including Defendant himself. The same evi-
dence which supports the claim of Plaintiff that the rep-
resentations made to him were false also supports the 
fact that the same, or similar, representations made to 
the witnesses Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger, and Shreeve 
were false. 
The case of Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Or. 100, 179 P. 2d 
550, (cited by Appellant) is clearly not in point. There 
the court pointed out that motive and intent were not in 
issue in the case so that statements made to third per-
sons would not be admissible to prove the same. In the 
instant case every allegation of the complaint with re-
spect to the elements of fraud was denied and put in issue 
by the Defendant, including knowledge, intent, and mo-
tive (whether Defendant made the statements for the pur-
pose of inducing Plaintiff to rely thereon). 
The evidence was clearly admissible for the purposes 
indica ted by the trial court in allowing it to come in. 
IV. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI-
DENCE TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT. 
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V. WERE THE REPRESENTATIONS FOUND 
TO HAVE BEEN MADE ACTIONABLE AS A 
MATTER OF LA:W. 
Points 4 and 5 are presented together because they 
involve substantially the same problem, to wit: whether 
the evidence is sufficient in fact or in law. Respondent 
agrees with the statement of law quoted by Appellant 
from the case of Paulson v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P. 
2d 621, as follows: (Appellant's Brief, p. 26) 
''The question of whether evidence is suffic-
ient to be clear and convincing is primarily for the 
trial court; his finding should not be disturbed 
unless we must say as a matter of lmw that no one 
could rea.sonably find the evidence to be clear and 
convincin.g." (Emphasis supplied) 
This Court reached the same conclusion in affirming 
the verdict of the jury in the Douglas Case, supra, stating: 
''The factual scene here, as reflected in the record, 
required submission of the case to the jury, there 
being sufficient substantial competent evidence 
which, if believed, would sustain the verdict and 
preclude us from disturbing it.'' 
Appellant argues that Plaintiff's testimony was in-
consistent. We submit that it was not. For instance, 
Plaintiff testified on direct examination that "He also 
told me that the bills were paid and that things were in 
fine condition." (Tr. 174) 
When asked about the same matter on cross-exami-
nation he testified : 
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"Q Did you know that the company had a then 
outstanding indebtedness¥ 
''A I did not. 
''Q Do you now say that Mr. Duvall said to you, 
in substance and effect, that as of that time, 
all of the bills were paid¥ 
''A He did. 
'' Q And the company was in fine condition? 
"A That is correct." (Tr. 186) 
Plaintiff was then asked about astatement made in 
his deposition which counsel apparently thought was in 
conflict with his present testimony. In answer to coun-
sel's inquiry, Plaintiff testified further: 
''A I did not know there was any outstanding 
bills. I knew nothing about the condition 
of the company; only what Duvall told me.'' 
Tr. 187) 
* * * * * 
'' Q Then, your answer as I haTe read it to you, 
'I preseumed there was,' was a false an-
swer~ Is that correct? 
''A The only way it could be false to me would 
be, if those tanks were on the property, 
which I did not know ; or were in transit 
or were contemplated. Then, I would not 
know, because he asked me for the money 
for the cost of the tanks.'' 
We believe the foregoing points out the firmness with 
which Plaintiff testified. While Plaintiff testified, as above 
indicated, that Defendant had represented to him that a 
loan was necessary in order to purchase certain tanks to 
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increase production at the mine, the record discloses that 
the money was not used for that purpose since no tanks 
or other equipment were purchased or paid for then or 
later. (Exhibit X) Appellant testified that "It was used 
to pay for material, or operating costs; was put in the 
general fund of the Duvall Company." (Tr. 127) How-
ever, he also testified that he told Plaintiff "that the 
shortage of money at the present time was partly occa-
sioned by the fact that we needed to put in those new tanks 
to improve the recovery." (Tr. 140) We submit that it 
was Appellant who shifted his testimony. In fact, he 
repeatedly avoided answering questions directly, whether 
the questions were put to him by his own counsel or 
by counsel for Plaintiff. 
We submit the evidence 1s sufficient to justify the 
Findings and Judgment of the trial court. The represen-
tations found by the Court to have been made are set out 
in the Findings (R. 27) and quoted by Appellant on page 
30 of his brief. Appellant claims that the representations 
found by the court to have been made are not actionable. 
Several Utah cases are cited and quoted from in connec-
tion with Appellant's discussion on this point. However, 
those cases do not support Appellant's position but are 
either distinguishable on the facts or state the law to 
be as contended for by Respondent herein. We desire to 
discuss the various authorities for the benefit of the 
Court. 
This Court has on numerous occasions outlined the 
basic elements of fraud. See Stuck v. Delta Land and fV a,-
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ter Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791. The question 
usually arises whether the misrepresentations are state-
ments of fact or mere conclusions, the general rule being 
that in order for a matter to be regarded as a statement 
of fact it must have been susceptible to actual knowledge, 
it must have been made unqualifiedly, and it must have 
been false. The leading Utah case on what constitutes 
statements of fact as distinguished from matters of opin-
ion is Campbell v. Zion's Co-op Home Building and Real 
Estate Company, 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401, wherein the Court 
held that statements such as "that investors will get hand-
some returns" and "that their investments will be safe," 
were, under the facts of that case, mere opinions of trade 
talk and were not actionable in and of themselves. How-
ever, the Court went on to sustain a judgment for the 
Plaintiffs because, as it held, there were several state-
ments made by the Defendants which were not mere opin-
ions, but were actionable. We quote from the opinion 
at p. 407: 
''Such representations, and the statements 
made by the defendant's president and secretary 
that the dividends had been earned and were jus-
tified, relate to material and existing or past 
facts .. . 
'' ... But the most important statements to 
these plaintiffs are those that the defendant had 
on hand sufficient money, property. or assets with 
which to pay 8 per cent dividends from the start, 
and from three to five years, without 'hurting the 
financial standing of the company.' and though 'it 
did not earn another cent,' and those guaranteeing 
a present ability to pay dividends ... On the rec-
ord, we do not find anything to justify eYen the 
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are: 
statements made to the plaintiffs purchasing stock 
prior to the 'big dividends.' " 
Other Utah cases which have discussed the matter 
Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 417-18, 48 Pac. 37, 
wherein the court said in speaking to this problem of 
opinion: 
''As a general rule, actionable fraud or mis-
representation consists in a false statement con-
cerning a fact material to the contract, and which 
is influential in producing it. Mere statements of 
value, made by a vendor, during negotiations be-
tween the parties, although known to be excessive, 
do not ordinarily constitute either a warranty or 
a fraud, unless the peculiar relation of confidence 
and trust existing between the parties is such that 
the person making the false representations had 
reason to believe that the other would rely and act 
upon them.'' 
(The court clearly held that in a situation where a 
relationship of confidence existed, the statement as to 
value would be actiov.able fraud.) 
In Stuck v. Deltd; Larnd and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 
227 P. 791, the court held that where there was a ques-
tion as to whether a represenattion was fact or opinion, 
the jury should determine the issue. After finding that 
some of the alleged statements involved were matters of 
opinion, the court went on to state : 
"However, there is at least one statement in 
the circulars that purports on its face to be a rep-
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resentation of fact. It represents Pahvant Valley 
to be 'a thoroughly proven general farming dis-
trict' ... Just what was meant by a 'thoroughly 
proven general farming district' is somewhat in-
definite, especially as to the nature and character 
of the proof ... Whether or not it was a repre-
sentation of an existing fact upon which the plain-
tiffs were entitled to rely was, under all the cir-
cumstances, a question for the jury to determine.'' 
A recent case on the subject is Pace v. Parrish, 122 
Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273, wherein plaintiffs sued for dam-
ages for false representations concerning the extent and 
condition of certain farming land. In affirming the judg-
ment, except for one item, this Court held: 
"With respect to the misrepresentation as to 
the condition of the fences : Plaintiffs' evidence 
was that the defendant told them that the property 
was fenced and cross-fenced with good fences; 
that this was not true; that some of the fences 
were in bad disrepair and in fact in places com-
pletely down. These places were remote from the 
area inspected and because of the difficulties above 
mentioned in getting around, we mll not disturb 
the jury's finding that this misrepresentation was 
false; that the plaintiffs '"ere reasonably entitled 
to rely upon it, and accordingly sustain the item 
of $100.00 awarded for such defectiYe fences.'' 
The defendant, Joseph A. Parrish, made certain rep-
resentations to the effect that a reservoir was upon the 
property being sold. He did not state that it "·as owned 
by sellers, according to his testimony, but plaintiffs 
claimed that he did so represent. The court further held: 
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''These representations concerning the reser-
voir could very well be interpreted to mean that 
the defendant owned the reservoir and all of the 
water in it and that it went with the place. The 
Paces could reasonably rely on these representa-
tions, as they did. The fact is that, although the 
reservoir was situated within the outside perim-
eter of the defendants' farm, both the reservoir 
and the land it was on belonged to the Northwest 
Irrigation Company, and the defendants were 
entitled to only one-fourth of the water. Defend-
ants do not claim that plaintiffs knew or were ad-
vised of this fact but Mr. Parrish testified: 'If they 
had asked me, I would have told them.' 
"Defendants suggest that the plaintiffs had 
no right to rely on the representations made by 
defendant, but were found to make more careful 
and complete inquiry concerning such matters. It 
is strange and inconsistent for defendants to urge 
the necessity for the plaintiffs to cross-examine 
Mr. Parrish and to doubt and verify his rep-
resentations. 
"As to reliance in such situations, see 5 Wil-
liston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Sec. 1512. The full 
measure of the plaintiffs' duty was to use reason-
able care and observation in connection with these 
representations. Having done so, it does not lie 
in defendant's mouth to say that they were too 
gullible and shouldn't have believed him.'' 
See Baird v. Eflow Investment Co., et aZ., 76 Utah 
232, 289 Pac. 112 (1930), where the Court found that de-
fendants had not been guilty of fraud but repeated the 
rule that although statements as to value are generally 
to be considered as opinions, a statement which is made 
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under circumstances such as exist in the present case, it 
is actionable. We quote : 
''It is the general rule that misrepresentations 
as to value do not ordinarily constitute fraud, as 
they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion 
or 'trader's talk' involving matter of judgment 
and estimation as to which me nmay differ. 26 
C. J. 1215 .... For such misrepresentations to be 
actionable they must be coupled with concealment 
of material facts or with artifice or misrepresenta-
tion used to prevent the hearer from learning thE 
truth, or be made under such circumstances as tc 
indicate that the hearer will rely on them, as wheJ 
the truth of the speaker's statement is a contro] 
ling element of the transaction, or because conf 
dential relations exist. But here nothing of tl 
kind appears to take the case out of the operati< 
of the general rule respecting such represent 
tions." (Emphasis supplied) 
In Beaver Drug Co. v. Hatch. 61 Utah 597, 217 Pa 
69'5, the court held that a statement to the effect that tl 
value of an inventory was $4,000 and that the Defem 
ant would guarantee the same was not an expression o 
opinion but would support an action in fraud. We quott 
from the opinion at 217 Pac. 697: 
"It is contended by appellant that whatever 
representations were made as to value, if any, 
were mere expressions of opinion, and he cites 
Mechem on Sales, paragraph 936, in 'vhich it is 
stated that where parties deal at arm's length and 
on an equal footing, representations concerning 
the worth or value of the goods sold will neither 
sustain an action nor warrant rescission. This doc-
trine is unchallenged. HoweYer, it has no applica-
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tion in the instant case. The representation as to 
the price of the goods was not a mere expression of 
opinion, but a statement of fact. The statement 
was that the goods would inventory $4,000 and 
the defendant would guarantee the same. The in-
ventory was to be made within 60 days from the 
date of the sale and be made by the Smith-Faus 
Drug Co. of Salt Lake City. It was so made and 
found to be $1,165.41 less than represented by de-
fendant during negotiation of the sale .... " 
The recent case of Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 
P. 2d 865 (1954) involved a situation where a widow and 
her daughter purchased a motel on contract from plain-
tiff, a real estate broker, and motel operator, and at-
tempted unsuccessfully to operate it. When the pur-
chasers became delinquent in their payments, Plaintiff, 
seller, sued to recover possession of the motel; and de-
fendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging among 
other things that the plaintiff had represented the income 
of the property to be $1,000.00 per month whereas in fact 
it was only $225.00 This Court reversed the decision of 
the trial court in favor of the defendant because the trial 
court had failed properly to instruct the jury on the mat-
ter of reliance on the representations which plaintiff had 
made. In doing so, however, the Court made some very 
important statements, as follows: 
"It is of course true that it must be assumed 
that a seller will represent his property at least 
in its best light. A ceriain amount of sales talk 
or "puffing' must be taken into account and al-
lowed for so long as it does not amount to active 
deception or concealment. On the other harnd,. the 
wide difference in experience arnd b1,~;siness acumen, 
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a.nd the degree to which Mrs. White placed con~ 
fidence in Mr. Lewis and relied upon his represen-
ta.tions are thin.gs which the jury cot~Jld take into 
consideration on the question of fraud. The evi-
dence being conflicting on these matters, the trial 
court correctly ruled that it was sufficient to war-
rant submission of the issue of fraud to the jury.'' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In Ma1yer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P. 2d 611, the 
court held that certain stock being sold was treasury stock 
of the company, that it was registered and was going to 
be sold on 1\fonday to an individual in New York, when 
in truth and in fact it was seller's stock, was a sufficient 
representation which if made would be actionable. 
In Ackerman. v. Bramwell Inv. Co., 80 Utah 52, 12 P. 
2d 623 ( 1932), the Court found no fraud on the part of 
the defendant but in doing so relied to a considerable 
extent on the fact that there was no relationship between 
the parties which entitled Plaintiff to rely upon the state-
ment made to him. The court said: 
"The representations that the note ·was 'as 
good as gold,' and that the inYestment company 
would see that the plaintiff 'did not lose a penny,' 
in and of themselYes; are matters of mere opin-
ion, exaggerated statements, and trade talk, and 
not actionable. So far as 'made to appear, the 
pla.intiff and tl1e int:estment company dealt at 
arm's length 1cith equal means of knotvledge, 
dealing 1t'ith each other on equal terms and free 
from. a.nd wninflueuccd by any fiduciary or trust 
relation. Before the plaintiff purchased the note, 
she intervie"\ved the \rhites "\Yith respect to it. Up 
to the time of the purchnse of the note, the \Vhites 
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had kept up their payments on the contract, and 
that she was satisfied with their ability to pay the 
note. Not anything is shown or made to appear, 
nor is there any claim made, that the plaintiff had 
not equal means with the investment company 
to find out the financial responsibility of the 
Whites, nor is it shown or made to appear or any 
claim made that there was anything with respect 
to their financial responsibility or inability to pay 
the note which was peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the investment company and not of the 
plaintiff, or that any such matter was withheld 
from the plaintiff by the company." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In the instant matter the Plaintiff testified not only 
that he placed confidence in the defendant, who was the 
president and manager of a savings and loan institution, 
but actually asked Defendant's advice as a financial 
adviser and stated to Defendant, Plaintiff was willing 
to act upon such advice. (Tr. 174, 176, 186) 
In addition to the foregoing cases decided by our 
own Supreme Court, there is considerable other authority 
on the matter which we feel supports Respondent's po-
sition. In 23 Am. Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section 
28, page 785, appears the following: 
"The distinction between fact and op1n10n is 
broadly indicated by the generalization that what 
was susceptible of exact knowledge when the state-
ment was made is usually considered as matter of 
fact. Representations in regard to matters not 
susceptible of personal knowledge are generally to 
be regarded as mere expressions of opinion, al-
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though they are made positively and as of the mak-
er's own knowledge. Usually, also, to say that a 
thing is only matter of opinion imports that it is 
unsusceptible of proof. The mere fact that a state-
ment takes the form of an expression of opinion, 
however, is not always conclusive. A statement 
may be so expressed as to bind the person making 
it to its truth, although stated in the form of an 
opinion, a;nd conversely, that a matter which neces-
. sarily rests in opinion is stated positively does not 
make it a statement of fact." (Emphasis supplied) 
In an annotation in 51 A.L.R. at Page 94 appears the 
following statement: 
''The doctrine that fraud cannot ordinarily be 
predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements 
as to future events has been applied, or at least 
recognized as applicable, in various cases where 
the representation was as to the profits or amount 
of sales which the other party would make if he 
entered into the contract in question. It seems that 
the rule is especially applicable to this class of 
cases, since a statement as to future profits neces-
sarily involves many elements of uncertainty, and 
should in ordinary cases be regarded as a mere 
expression of opinion on part of the person making 
it. But it also seems that the misrepresentations 
may easily amount in such cases to misstatements 
of fact, and that fra.'lfrd may be predicated on a 
statement regard·ing future profits, if the person 
making it has no reasonable grounds on whi.ch to 
base it, and has no honest belief in its truth, but 
makes the statement merely for the purpose of 
misleading a11d defrauding the other party; 
as, where a business sold is being conducted at a 
loss, and the positiYe assertion is made by the sell-
er to the purchaser, to induce the purchase, that 
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the latter will receive large profits therefrom. This 
may be construed as a misrepresentation of exist-
ing conditions.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
In a later annotation (27 A.L.R. 2d at page 38) ap-
pears the following: 
'A vague statement that a property or busi-
ness is 'profitable,' or a 'money-maker,' or the 
like, may sometimes be treated as one of fact. 
''For example, a statement by the owner and 
operator of a resort hotel to a prospective pur-
chaser that he is making' good money' in the busi-
ness, whereas he has never made a profit in any 
season, cannot be regarded as 'mere puff talk' of 
an enthusiastic salesman but is a statement of fact 
by one who knows the facts to one to whom the 
facts are not readily available. Spies v. Brandt 
(1950) 230 Minn. 247, 41 NW2d 561, 27 A.L.R. 2d 
1, wherein there were more specific statements as 
to past and future profits. 
"A representation that a new corporation 'is 
a good paying proposition and a good going con-
cern' was held to be fraudulent in Community 
State Bank v. Day (1923) 126 Wash. 687, 219 P. 
43, where made by the cashier of a bank to induce 
plaintiff to buy stock, it appearing that the cashier 
then knew that the corporation had mortgaged 
all its assets to the bank only a few days before 
and that the corporation was not making money 
and was not paying its bills in the ordinary course 
of business. 
"In Sherman v. Smith (1918) 185 Iowa 654, 
169 N.W. 216, the court held that statements that 
a corporation was doing a good business and was 
making money and that the builder of the business 
had a fine business and was doing well therein, 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
being made to induce plaintiff to buy stock in the 
corporation, could not be classed as nonaction-
able opinions if the speaker knew that the corpo-
ration had been doing business at a loss, was large-
ly in debt, and had been compelled to borrow 
money to pay its debts and running expenses. 
''A representation that a mining lease was 
'paying expenses' was held to be one of fact in 
Beard v. Bliley (1893) 3 Colo. App. 479, 34P. 271." 
The courts have also held that matters which are 
generally considered opinionative statements may never-
theless be fraudulent under facts similar to the present 
case in establishing fraud found in Paragraph 4 (B) 
and (D) of the Findings (R. 27). See 23 Am. Jur., 
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 29: 
''There are many qualifications and modifica-
tions of the rule that actionable fraud cannot be 
based upon the mere expression of an opinion. 
Frequently, even a false assertion of an opinion 
will amount to a fraud, where under the circum-
stances the other party has a right to rely upon 
what is stated or represented. Thus, an expres-
sion of opinion may amount to fraud where it is a 
mere contrivance of fraud, where the person to 
whom it was expressed has justly relied upon it 
and been misled, or where it is coupled with other 
circumstances, as where it is accompanied by 
active fraud or concealment. 
'' ... Moreover, where a speaker asserts as a 
fact something which forms material inducement 
for a transaction, he cannot complain, if his asser-
tion is treated as factual matter, although if ex-
pressed as an opinion it would not be actionable. 
If a vendee relies on the representations of the 
vendor and acts upon the faith thereof, without 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
relying on his own judgment or opinion, and this 
is known to the vendor, the latter cannot shelter 
himself under the pretense that his representation 
was a mere expression of opinion, when it is dis-
covered to be false. 
"Where a statement consists in part of opin-
ionative matter and in part of factual matter, al-
though the whole statement formed the inducement 
to engage in the transaction, a charge of fraud is 
maintainable if the factual part was false to the 
knowledge of the speaker, or the whole was a co-
mingling of fiction and opinion expressed with the 
intent of deceiving. A statement which by itself 
might be a mere expression of opinion may be so 
connected with a statement of a material fact 
as to amount to fraud. In other words, it has been 
held that the rule that no one is liable for an ex-
pression of an opinion is applicable only when the 
opinion stands by itself as a distinct thing, and is 
intended to be taken as distinct from anything 
else.'' 
Also: 
"It is settled that an expression of opinion 
may, under many circumstances, amount to fraud 
where there is a relation of trust and confidence 
between the parties. A fidiciary relationship be-
tween the parties imposes upon the one who is 
trusted a duty not only to state truly all matters, 
whether of fact or of opinion, but also to disclose 
all material facts and even his opinion as to the 
present or prospective value of the subject mat-
ter, etc. 
"In order to hold one liable for fraud for the 
expression of an opinion, the relationship between 
the parties need not be a formal fiduciary or con-
fidential one in all instances, such as the relation-
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ship of trustee and cestui que trust. It is sufficient 
that the representor had superior knowledge, and 
knew that the representee confided in him a;nd 
was guided by his opin.ion. Even matters of opin-
ion may amount to affirmation, and be the in-
ducement to a contract, especially where the par-
ties are not dealing on equal terms, and one of 
them has, or is presumed to have, means of infor-
mation not equally open to the other. Hence, the 
rule is that if the person expressing the opinion 
possesses superior knowledge, and it is a justi-
fiable conclusion that he intended untruly to imply 
that he knew facts such as would justify his opin-
ion, his opinion may be regarded in law as an 
assertion of fact and not honestly entertained.'' 
(Ibid Sec. 30) 
While the areas of fact and opinion are not clearly 
delineated, it does seem clear that where there is a fair 
question as to which a statement is, the matter must be 
submitted to the jury as a question of fact. See 24 Am. 
Jur., FRAUD AND DECEIT, Section 293: 
''A statement may be so clearly the expression 
merely of the opinion of the person making it not 
to be relied upon as a representation of fact that it 
may be held as a matter of la-w not actionable as 
a false representation constituting a fraud. Thus, 
it has been held error to submit to the jury the 
question wherther a representation by the vendor 
of lands that they contained large deposits of oil 
was understood as a rna tter of opinion or a repre-
sentation of a fad as ·within the vendor's knowl-
ege, where the land had never been tested and the 
matter therefore necessarily rested in opinion. 
It is, however, often impossible to state as a matter 
of law whether a statement is an expression of the 
opinion of the speaker or a representation of fact 
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to be relied upon as made within his knowledge, 
and when such is the case, the question is one of 
fact ... " (Emphasis supplied) 
See also Baird v. Eflow Investment Co., et aZ., supra. 
In the case of J. C. Miller Estate, Inc. v. Drury, 120 
vVash. 694, 208 P. 77, it was held that representations 
that bank stock was of the value of $125.00 per share and 
was earning a 10 per cent dividend, and that the bank 
was in a prosperous condition, when in fact the dividends 
had been paid out of capital and the bank failed four 
months after the transactions, were material in establish-
ing fraud. 
Appellant in his argument has attempted to minimize 
the effect of the several representations made by him by 
isolating each and asserting that standing alone such rep-
resentation is not sufficient. In the first place, we do not 
agree that any representation is inadequate on which to 
base a finding for Plaintiff but in any event the repre-
sentations in this case are interrelated.-The statement that 
300,000 tons of ore were blocked out is not only a material 
false representation itself but gives more body or sub-
stance to the representations that the mine was worth 
more than $2,000,000.00 and therefore an offer for that 
amount had been refused. 
Although Appellant seems to have trouble with the 
phrase "fine condition" as used in Finding No.4 (C) no 
snch question existed in the mind of Appellant's witness 
Pierce who was asked on cross-examination: 
39 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q 
"A 
"Q 
"A 
"Q 
"A 
"Q 
"A 
However, you would not state that in each 
one of these years, 1950, 1951, or 1952 that 
the mine was in fine condition and working 
fine, would you~ 
The plant never worked fine. 
And in 1950, after the plant got into opera-
tion, and in 1951 and 1952, you would not be 
in a position to state that the uplant was ever 
paying its bills from the income it was re-
ceiving from the operation, would you~ 
No, no one asked me ; no one asked me if the 
mine was running fine, or if the plant was 
running fine. 
When you say 'no one asked you,' what-
I mean other than those who were in the 
actual operation- Mr. Romney, Mr. Duvall 
-of course, we could see. I knew from the 
trouble we were having with the plant, that 
it was not running fine. 
And when you say it was not running fine, 
you discussed this with ~1:r. Duvall so that he 
knew it was not~ 
Certaintly he knew.'' ( Tr. 290) 
This Court, in J(innear, et al. \. Pro2cs, 81 Utah 135, 
16 P. 2d 1094, held that the alleged representation that, 
''. . . stock paid dividends of 10 per cent annually was 
such a material representation \Yhich, if false and relied 
on, would support an action for fraud.'' The court also 
went on to hold that a representation to the effect that 
stock was not assessable when in truth and in fact it was 
would be be material and would support an action in 
fraud. 
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In De Frees v. Carr, 8 Utah 488, 33 Pac. 217, the 
court held that a representation by the defendant that a 
company had made $5,659.70 profits during a certain 
period and that plaintiff's share of this amount would 
be $943.28, when in truth and in fact the company was 
insolvent, were material and relief should be granted 
even though the plaintiff might have informed himself 
as to the facts but did not. 
VI. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
Appellant complains that the trial court did not 
make adequate and sufficient findings. While the trial 
court must make findings upon all material issues raised 
by the pleadings, there is no requirement that the court 
make any findings on matters not raised by the issues 
and not in dispute during the trial. First, as stated by 
Appellant the uncontradicted evidence disclosed that the 
company discontinued operations after mining only 113,-
000 tons of ore. This was one of the points used by 
Plaintiff-not Appellant-to establish that the repre-
sentation that 300,000 tons of ore was blocked out was 
false. In other words, the fact that only 113,000 tons of 
ore was mined indicated that not in excess of that 
amount had ever been blocked out and that the Defend-
ant was aware of the extent of the ore body sufficiently 
so that he could not in good faith represent that 300,000 
tons of ore had been blocked out. It was unnecessary for 
the court to make the specific determination that only 
113,000 tons of ore had been mined because the court 
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found that the representation that 300,000 tons of ore 
had been blocked out was in fact false. 
Second, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant represent-
ed that there had been 300,000 tons of ore blocked out 
''ranging in value from $4.20 per ton to $50.00 per ton 
and that said ore averaged not less than $7.00 per ton, 
when in truth and in fact, said Defendant well knew that 
the diamond drilling of said property had not resulted in 
finding ore of commercial value, and that in no event 
had more than 200,00 tons of proven and probable ore 
been blocked out.'' (R. 16) The Court, in finding the rep-
res~ntation to have been made in respect to this matter, 
found that Defendant represented "that said Duvall 
Mining Company had, as a result of diamond drilling 
and tunnelling, blocked out 300,000 tons of ore contain-
ing gold ranging in value from $4.20 per ton and less, 
to as high as $50.00 per ton when in truth and in fact 
Defendant well knew that only 200,000 tons of proven 
and probable ore had been blocked out." (R. 27) "While 
the Court did not find the representation to ha\e been 
made exactly as it was alleged in the complaint, nor did 
the court find that all of the representation made was 
false it nevertheless does not follow that the Finding is 
defective in this respect. If anyone '"ere entitled to 
complain of such Finding it "·ould be the Plaintiff since 
the Court might well haYe found that the ore blocked 
out was not of commercial Yalue in the light of the testi-
mony which showed that the average assay of the ore 
was approximately $5.50 per ton while the cost of mining 
the same was in excess of $7.00 per ton. Certainly ore 
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which is of less value than the cost of mining the same 
is not commercial ore. 
Again, Appellant complains because the Court did 
not make any finding in respect to what happened in so 
far as replacing the money which Plaintiff had used to 
make the initial loan to the Duvall Company. According 
to the testimony, Plaintiff issued to the Duvall Company 
his personal check in the amount of $5,000.00 Approxi-
mately six months later he withdrew the $5,000.00 on 
deposit with the Defendant's savings and loan institu-
tion and put the money back into his personal and busi-
ness account. There was no issue raised in respect to 
this rna tter ; and how the making of any finding as re-
quested by Defendant could have affected the conclu-
sion or judgment in the case is beyond our compre-
hension. The Plaintiff loaned the Duvall Company 
$5,000.00 at the request of and upon the representations 
made by Defendant. The $5,000.00 was never returned 
and at the time the loan was made there was no possi-
bility of repaying the money because of the hopeless in-
solvency of the Company. It had no assets of value 
except for some items of equipment which had been sub-
stantially depreciated. It was indebted not only on open 
account for thousands of dollars but to note holders in 
the approximate amount of $300,000.00 ; and its stock 
was worthless. 
Appellant further asked the Court to find that 
money loaned to the Duvall Company was money which 
belonged to Plaintiff and his wife jointly. This the Court 
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refused to do having already found in Findings No. 3 
and 5 that the money was loaned to the Duvall Company 
by the Plaintiff. 
The last group of proposed findings submitted by 
Defendant related to the matter of the value of the note 
and security given by the Duvall Company. By its re-
quest No. 21, Defendant asked the Court to find that the 
shares of stock in the Duvall Company received by the 
Plaintiff were not without value. The Court found that 
"said stock was at the time of said delivery worthless 
and of no value." (R. 28) It, therefore, could not find 
that such stock did have value. To the same effect was 
requested Finding No. 22 where the Court was asked to 
find tha:t the loan and the note given by the Duvall Com-
pany was not without value. This again the Court re-
fused to do having found in Findings No. 7 and 8 that 
the Company was insolvent and unable to pay the note 
and that the stock was without value and that the only 
amount which the Plaintiff receiYed on account of the 
transaction was the sum of $336.00, which was received 
after liquidation of the equipment, about March 6, 
1958. (R. 28) 
Appellant argues that the word "insolvency" is not 
a sufficient finding in respect to the question of the value 
of the note. It was not only found by the Court that the 
Company was and is insolYent, but also, that it was un-
able to pay the amount of the advance. If it was not 
able to pay the amount of the adYance and the security 
given in connection therewith was worthless it is obvious 
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that the note was likewise worthless. No person will, if 
he is aware of the true facts, make a loan to an insolvent 
company who cannot repay the loan and take in con-
nection therewith stock or other property of no value. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court did not err in 
refusing to making findings as requested by Appellant. 
VII. ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY ON PROOF 
OF DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Appellant claims there has been no proof of dam-
age by Respondent in this matter. Apparently the fact 
that Plaintiff lost $5,000.00 as well as the benefit of the 
use of the money and the 500 shares of stock in the Du-
vall Company which was represented to be worth in 
excess of $14,000.00 does not seem to satisfy Defend-
ant. The Court in its Finding No. 9 held : 
''By reason of the false and fraudulent represen-
tations made to him by the Defendant herein, 
Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $5,000.00; 
plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum 
from December 21, 1952, less the amount received 
by Plaintiff from the liquidation of the assets of 
the Duvall Company in the sum of $336.00. '' 
(R. 28) 
This Finding of damage is adequately supported by 
the evidence and no citation of authority is necessary to 
support the same. 
However, Appellant makes the statement in his brief 
that it is necessary for this court to establish a theory of 
damages in regard to fraud cases. He then quotes the 
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rule which was enunciated in the case of Hecht v. Metzler, 
14 Utah 408, 48 P. 37, which states that damages in a 
fraud action should be computed as if the case were being 
tried the day after the contract was entered into. There 
is no reason to assume that this theory was not used by 
the trial court in this case. Appellant then cites the Ver-
mont case of Crowley v. Goodrich, 44 A 2d 128, and quotes 
from that decision the following: 
'' ... it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to allege 
and prove that it was not collectible at the time the 
loan was made because of the insolvency of maker 
or for any other sufficient reason.'' (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Every a cursory look at the several financial state-
ments of the Duvall Company during the period in ques-
tion (Exhibits E, K, P, Q and T) will reveal that the 
now defunct Duvall Company was insolvent on December 
21, i952, the time when the loan was made to defendant, 
and could not repay any portion of the loan. Respondent 
has therefore fulfilled the requirement set up by the Court 
in the Crowley Case. 
Appellant states that a casual examination of the 
Company's financial statement dated December 31, 1952, 
WOUld disclose SOme '' Yery tangible assets,'' yet it owed 
$300,000.00 on notes which were due and unpaid, plus in-
terest thereon, and could not pay its current bills (for 
which latter purposes the loan "·as used) . ..A.pproximatel~ 
10 months later these "tangible assets'· were assigned to 
the Intermountain Association of Credit Men ·who liqui-
dated the same and paid only a few of the creditors, in-
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/1 ~ 
eluding Respondent, a nominal part of the amount owing. 
(It must be remembered that most of the note holders 
signed an agreement to subordinate their obligations or 
there would have been substantially less recovery). (See 
Exhibits 13 and T) 
In measuring the amount of damages to be awarded, 
the most familiar rule applied by the courts is the so-
called "benefit of the bargain" rule whereby the injured 
party not only gets back the amount which he has parted 
with, but also the benefit of any bargain which he might 
have otherwise obtained if the facts were as represented. 
Thus, in the present case, part of the inducement and con-
sideration for making the loan being the additional trans-
fer of shares of stock in the Duvall Company, Plaintiff 
would be entitled to recover not just his $5,000.00 out of 
pocket loss, but he should also recover a further amount 
equal to the reasonable value of the stock had the mine 
been worth what it was represented to be. See 24 Am. Jur. 
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Page 55, Sec. 227, where the 
rule is stated to be : 
''The great weight of authority sustains the 
general rule that a person acquiring property by 
virtue of a commercial transaction, who has been 
defrauded by false representations as to the value, 
quality, or condition of the property, may recover 
as damages in a tort action the differences between 
the actual value of the property at the time of 
making the contract and the value that it would 
have possessed if the representations had been 
true. In other words, the defrauded party is en-
titled to recover the difference between the real 
and the represented value of the property.'' 
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The Utah cases cited in support of this general rule 
are Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 
P. 791; and Hect v. Metzler, supra. 
Other Utah cases which have applied the same rule 
are Kinrn.ear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. 2d 1094, and 
Pa.ce v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273. 
However, where the representations are not of the 
nature of expressing value, or where they induce the 
expenditure of money by way of of a loan or otherwise 
which would not have been made except for the misrepre-
sentations, the courts have frequently used the rule for 
measuring damages generally applied in tort cases. 
The following quotations are taken from 24 Am. Jur., 
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 217, et seq: 
''As a general rule, one injured by the com-
mission of fraud is entitled to recover such dam-
ages in a tort action as will compensate him for the 
loss or injury actually sustained and place him in 
the same position that he would have occupied had 
he not been defrauded." (p. 47) 
''Under general principles as to damage, an 
injured party is entitled to recover in a tort action 
such damages as result directly, naturally, and 
proximately from fraud, including those which 
were actually or presumptiYely within the contem-
ulation of the parties when the fraud was com-
mitted. The recovery is restricted in all cases to 
such damages as were the natural and proximate 
consequenees of the fraud and such as can be clear-
ly defined and aseertained.'' (p. 48) 
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As stated by this Court in the case of Pa.rk v. M oar-
man Mfg. Compan.y, 121 Utah 339, 241 P. 2d 914: 
''The fundamental principle of damages is to 
restore the injured party to the position he would 
have been in had it not been for the wrong of the 
other party. ' ' 
In the case of U. 8. v. Ben Grunstein and Sons Co., 
137 Fed. Supp. 197, the court stated: 
''Indeed, if we look through the long line of 
cases, both Federal and State, dealing with dam-
ages in common law fraud actions, so often alluded 
to as conflicting, we find such conflict to be more 
apparent than real. Every one of them, in essence, 
attempts to give the person defrauded such dam-
ages as he can prove 'naturally and proximately 
resulted from the fraud,' ... In cases where the 
person defrauded can credibly and reasonably es-
tablish that which he would have received but for 
the fraud, it is that which the Court gives him, less 
that he has already received from the fraud doer. 
In other cases where the evidence, as to what the 
person defrauded has lost due to the fraud, has 
been but speculative, so that he cannot credibly 
establish such value, then such person is remitted 
to what he can credibly establish he has lost, i.e., 
the contract price, less again the value of what 
he has already received.'' ... 
In White v. Gordon, 130 Ore.139, 279 P. 289, the court 
held that the measure of damages for fraudulently pro-
curing a loan on inadequate security was the difference 
between the amount of loan and the value of the security 
at the date of loan, with interest from that time. 
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We submit that the Finding on damages is adequate 
and that it is well supported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing analysis and discussion this 
Court should determine that there was no error commit-
ted by the trial court. However, should there appear to 
be any technncal error, Respondent respectfully submits . 
that such error would not justify or require a reversal 
of the Judgment. Rule 61 U.R.C.P. provides as follows: 
"No error in either the admission of the ex-
clusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground 
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing 
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties.'' 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
NIELSEN AND CONDER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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